The principle of equal treatment has become constitutionalized within the framework of the EU legal order. However, its scope and substance remain uncertain, its impact is confined to the restricted horizons of EU law, and its normative foundations are contested. This paper explores these issues by focusing on a number of judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases involving claims of discrimination based on the ground of sexual orientation. These judgments illustrate both the positive impact and also the uncertain scope and substance of the principle of equal treatment as constitutionalized within EU law.
principle is reflected in the provisions of Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, which set out a general right to equality and non-discrimination and a more focused guarantee of equality between men and women respectively. It is this second, individual rights-focused aspect of the equal treatment principle which has played a key role in the 'internal' development of EU equality law.
C. The Establishment of Equality as a Fundamental Norm of EU Law
The existence of a general principle of equal treatment was first affirmed in the context of gender equality -initially by the EU legislator rather than by the Court. Article 1 of Directive 1976/207/EEC (the 'Equal Treatment Directive') provided that the purpose of this Directive was 'to put into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women' -which was understood to constitute an extension of the 'principle of equal pay' set out in the original Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. In Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 3) , the Court linked this principle to the protection of fundamental rights, concluding that 'respect for 16 See in general K. Lenaerts and J. Gutiérrez-Fons, 'The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law ', 47 CMLR (2010 ', 47 CMLR ( ), p. 1629 ', 47 CMLR ( -1669 For a comprehensive philosophical analysis of this idea, see R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press, 2000) , especially Chapters 2 and 4.
fundamental personal human rights is one of the general principles of community law, the observance of which it has a duty to ensure', and that 'there can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights '. 19 In subsequent sex discrimination judgments, the Court affirmed that the provisions of the gender equality directives gave specific expression to this principle of equal treatment between men and women, and should be interpreted in a purposive manner in order to ensure effective protection of the right to non-discrimination on grounds of sex. 20 For example, in P and S v. Cornwall the Court stated that the provisions of the Equal Treatment
Directive were 'simply the expression, in the relevant field, of the principle of equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law', and proceeded to interpret the scope of the Directive by reference to 'its purpose and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard '. 21 Subsequently, the Court established in its judgment in Mangold 22 that the age discrimination provisions of the Framework Equality Directive also gave specific expression to the general principle of equal treatment, whose scope extended beyond gender to cover the other nondiscrimination grounds protected by the 2000 Directives. In its judgment, the Court concluded that the non-discrimination provisions of Directive 2000/78/EC set out a 'general framework' of rules. These gave specific expression to this general principle that constituted a separate, free-standing and 'active principle' of the Community legal order in its own right, and whose 'source' was to be found in the non-discrimination provisions of international human rights law and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
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The Court also concluded in Mangold that it was the 'responsibility of national courts to guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination' by setting aside national laws that were incompatible with this fundamental norm of the European legal order. 24 This finding also appeared to break new ground. The case law of the Court had previously established that EU secondary legislation and national legal measures implementing EU law had to be set aside if they failed to comply with the general principles of the European legal order. 25 However, for the first time the Court in Mangold applied this national laws which do not conform with the principle of equal treatment must be set aside insofar as they relate to matters subject to regulation by EU law, Test-Achats demonstrates that EU laws must also comply with the requirements of this principle as reflected in the nondiscrimination provisions of the Charter.
E. The Equality Principle as an Embedded Constitutional Norm
To summarize, the CJEU has made it clear that the EU equality directives have to be interpreted and applied with reference to the general principle of equal treatment, which is 'given expression' by their provisions but nevertheless constitutes a free-standing, 'active' norm of the EU legal order in its own right. This principle is derived from and gives effect to the individual right to equality and non-discrimination that is embedded in international human rights law and the constitutional traditions of the Member States, and now is also protected by the non-discrimination provisions of the EU Charter. 39 The provisions of the equality directives and other elements of EU secondary legislation will be interpreted by reference to this equality principle, 40 while EU legislation and national law affecting matters subject to EU law must respect its requirements. The principle may also exceptionally be given direct effect in horizontal relationships: national laws which conflict with the principle must be set aside, even if this affects the legal rights of private parties.
Significantly, this conformity requirement has particular force, which extends above and beyond the requirement to respect certain other rights and principles set out in the EU Charter. In the case of AMS, the CJEU concluded that Article 27 of the Charter, which guarantees the right of workers to information and consultation, could not be invoked in a horizontal dispute between private entities so as to disapply a piece of national legislation which was alleged to breach this right, on the basis that it had not been given 'more specific expression' in EU law. 41 In contrast, the Court affirmed that the 'principle of nondiscrimination (…) is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as such '. 42 This confirms that the equality principle occupies a particularly important and well-established place within the framework of EU law, even when compared with the legal effect of other rights and principles set out in the EU Charter such as the right of workers to information and consultation at issue in AMS.
In general, the principle of equal treatment is now acknowledged to be a fundamental norm of the European legal order, and occupies an elevated status in the EU hierarchy of values. to also include colour, social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property and birth. However, it is unclear whether the 'constitutionalized' dimension of the principle of equal treatment also extends this far. There is still uncertainty as to whether the CJEU will apply a similar approach as it adopted in Test- The relationship between the equality principle and other principles of EU law -in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality -is also unclear. 46 For example, it is not entirely clear whether the approach adopted by the CJEU when applying a proportionality analysis in the context of nationality discrimination cases will be carried across to other non-discrimination grounds, or whether the Court will take the view that different legal logics are in play. The extent to which the equality principle permits positive action measures is also uncertain, along with the question of the exact nature of the relationship between the directives and the equality principle to which they 'give expression'.
For example, it remains to be seen how the CJEU might set about assessing whether any Many of these criticisms are over-stated -or at least fail to give due recognition to the positive achievements of EU equality law, and its potential to make a modest but nevertheless invaluable contribution towards the creation of a more just 'social Europe'.
53 However, they demonstrate that legitimacy of the development of EU law in this context is contested, as also graphically illustrated by the reaction to the Mangold judgment. As a consequence, the CJEU -in interpreting and applying EU equality law, including the principle of equal treatment and Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter -must invariably be aware of its limits set by EU competency in this regard and the need to maintain the delicate ecosystem of separation of powers between EU and national institutions. This invariably imposes some constraint on the transformative potential of the equality principle within EU law: issues of legitimacy and the limits to EU competence cast a long shadow in this context. The transformative potential of the constitutionalization of the principle of equal treatment within the EU legal order is also intrinsically limited by the ambiguity that surrounds the concept of 'equality' itself. As is well known, different views exist as to the meaning of equality and what respect for the right to non-discrimination entails. Broadly speaking, 'formal equality' approaches emphasize the importance of treating similarly situated groups in a similar manner and avoiding the use of classifications based on grounds such as race, gender, disability and so on, while 'substantive equality' approaches emphasize the need to eliminate the barriers which impede the capacity of underrepresented social groups to participate in social, economic and cultural life. 54 Elements of both these different approaches can be detected in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the provisions of the equality directives, and academic debate persists as to their relative merits.
C. The Ambiguous Concept of Equality
However, what unifies these different concepts of equality is a focus on comparative disadvantage, that is, on combating less favourable treatment of one social group as compared to another. This 'comparative' focus is hardwired into the DNA of EU equality law, but it does not in itself establish when different social groups should be treated as being similarly situated, or as deserving of equal treatment. Nor does it define the 'floor' of rights protection that all individuals are entitled to enjoy -other concepts such as human dignity play a role in this regard, but have not been constitutionalized within EU equality law to the level or degree of precision, depth and substance as has equality.
As a consequence, equality remains a fluid, ambiguous concept within EU law, just as it does in other legal systems. It is first necessary to define when individuals and groups are in comparable situations before the protection afforded by the equality principle kicks in. At times, this will be a straightforward task, in particular when the individuals and groups in question are self-evidently in an analogous or similar situation. However, in other circumstances, the legal position will be less clear-cut -and the CJEU, along with national courts applying EU equality norms, may be forced to make difficult choices as to whether individuals and groups are in a comparable situation.
Furthermore, EU equality law has not engaged to any real degree (outside of the specific context of harassment) with forms of group disadvantage which are not so easily framed in terms of comparative disadvantage -such as a failure to take action to redress specific disadvantages faced by a particular social group, or to redress status harms and other dignitarian concerns which may have a disproportionate impact on certain groups. In general, EU equality law has a limited vocabulary -it is focused on remedying particular types of harm, as when one group is subject to a clearly defined material disadvantage when 54 See in general S. Fredman, Discrimination Law (2 nd edition, OUP, 2011).
Again, some commentators have criticized this conclusion as being unduly formalistic and deferential, 66 but it highlighted how the choice of comparator can be a fluid and uncertain process, which inevitably will be influenced by concerns about legitimacy and competency.
The Court's decision in this case to opt for the choice of a comparator that left the status quo intact reflects the normative uncertainty that surrounded the principle of equality at the time.
This uncertainty continues to exist today even if the specific legal situation at issue in Grant has been altered with the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment and occupation introduced by the Framework Equality Directive in 2000. States to permanently exclude donations from 'persons whose sexual behaviour puts them at high risk of acquiring severe infectious diseases that can be transmitted by blood'. In this respect, the Court took note of some data relating to the epidemiological situation in France which, according to the French Government and the European Commission, had some very specific characteristics: namely, almost all HIV infections were due to sexual relations, half of those newly infected were men who have had sexual relations with other men, and such men were the population most affected by HIV, with a rate of infection which was 200 times greater than that for the heterosexual population in France and a prevalence of HIV that was the highest among all states in Europe and Central Asia. It went on to decide that it was for the French tribunal to determine whether this data was still relevant and reliable, and whether in turn this established that men having sexual relations with other men constituted a 'high risk' group. Secondly, the Court went on to consider whether -conditional upon determining if men who have had sexual relations with other men were deemed to constitute a 'high risk' group -the imposition of an absolute ban was consistent with the fundamental rights protected within the EU legal order. In particular, the Court had to consider the compatibility with the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as given 'particular expression' via Article 21 of the Charter.
The Court took the view that the absolute ban constituted a limitation on this right, as it treated men who had sexual relations with other men differently from others -which therefore meant that it must be shown to be objectively justified. The Court accepted that the absolute ban furthered a legitimate objective, namely the protection of public health.
However, it went on to note that 'a permanent deferral from blood donation for the whole group of men who have had sexual relations with other men is proportionate only if there are no less onerous methods of ensuring a high level of health protection for recipients'. 83 It also noted that it was possible that laboratory techniques existed which could provide effective screening of any donated blood, and also that alternative methods might also be used to identify individuals engaged in high risk sexual behaviour, such as the use of questionnaires and interviews with medical personnel. It therefore concluded that the national court should assess whether the absolute ban was proportionate and necessary given the existence of these alternative screening methods, and whether the use of such alternative methods in place of the absolute ban would be effective in ensuring a high level of health protection.
The Court therefore assessed whether France's absolute ban was objectively justified, and identified potential grounds for concern that the ban was not proportionate -although it left it to the national court to carry out the detailed assessment of the sufficiency of other screening methods that is necessary in this context.
At first glance, this judgment is notable for its rigorous application of the objective justification test, and its insistence that the principle of equality must be respected even in the specific context of the regulation of blood donation. It illustrates the reach of EU law, and by extension the potential impact of the equality principle and the CJEU's role in enforcing compliance with its requirements. had to comply with the requirements of the principle of equal treatment and be shown to be objectively justified. Again, he identified potential issues as to the proportionality of the absolute ban, including the fact that the absolute ban was inconsistent in that it did not prevent heterosexual men who repeatedly engaged in high-risk unprotected sex from giving blood, or women whose partners might have had sexual relations with other men.
In other words, Advocate General Mengozzi's Opinion demonstrated a much greater degree of awareness of how the ban could reinforce stereotypes and thus attack the dignity and status of gay men than did the ultimate judgment of the Court, which in contrast appeared to endorse the argument of the French government that gay and bisexual men had to be treated collectively as a 'high risk' group. In general, and in contrast to Mengozzi's Opinion, the Court adopted a quite formalistic and acontextual analysis, which placed little weight on the status harms associated with the absolute nature of the ban, and the manner in which it could be viewed as reflecting and reinforcing stereotypes about the behaviour of gay and bisexual men. As a consequence, the guidance it provided to the French courts on how to assess the proportionality of the absolute ban is lacking the dignitarian dimension present in Advocate General Mengozzi's Opinion -and is all the poorer for that.
E. The Asylum Cases -Dignity Enters the Picture?
Léger thus illustrates both the potency of the constitutionalized equality principle and the limited concept of equality underpinning it. Its potency is visible by the CJEU clarifying that the French law implementing the 2004 Directive has to comply with the equality principle and that the absolute ban on blood donations from men who had sexual relations with other men had to satisfy an exacting proportionality analysis. The judgment demonstrates how the principle can exert a destabilizing effect over areas of legal regulation far removed from the usual areas where EU equality law usually has an impact: however, it also highlights how equality tends to be viewed in constrained and narrow terms within the EU legal framework. In two recent judgments, the Court has been called upon to determine the standards that should apply in determining claims for refugee status made by third country nationals on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution based on their sexual orientation. In both cases, the Court applied a contextual analysis rooted in respect for human dignity, which took account of the specific nature of the degrading and unequal treatment often faced by LGBT persons as well as of their entitlement to equal concern and respect within the functioning of national systems for determining refugee status. Neither of these judgments are free from criticism. Some commentators have suggested that the CJEU did not go far enough in extending protection against the criminalization of samesex acts in X and Y, while others suggest that A, B and C fails to provide clear guidance as to how asylum seekers can prove their claim that they face persecution on the grounds of their sexual orientation. 92 However, taken together, they demonstrate a willingness on the part of the CJEU to address discriminatory and intrusive treatment of gay asylum seekers through the lens of human dignity. They add a new dimension to the Court's jurisprudence in respect of sexual orientation, which remains absent for now from much of its case law actually focused on the principle of equal treatment. They also demonstrate that the constitutionalization of equality within the EU legal order is not just being channeled through the principle of equal treatment and the non-discrimination provisions of Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, but also is being slowly supplemented by the Court's emerging jurisprudence relating to human dignity and personal autonomy.
§5. Conclusion
The constitutionalization of the principle of equal treatment has given great potency to nondiscrimination rights within the EU legal order. However, the scope and substance of this principle remains unclear, and it appears to give effect to an uncertain and limited concept of equality. This imposes constraints on its transformative potential, as illustrated by cases such as Grant and (to a lesser extent) Maruko. Furthermore, cases such as Léger highlight the need for the CJEU's equality jurisprudence to engage to a greater degree with the values of human dignity and personal autonomy -as the Court has arguably begun to do in its case law on asylum seekers claiming refugee status on the basis of their sexual orientation. The relatively thin concept of equal treatment that has been constitutionalized within EU law needs to be fleshed out and given a more substantive dimension -and the language of dignity may have something to add to the vocabulary of equality in this regard.
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